From Iran to Russia, Africa, and North Korea, the Obama administration has long relied on financial sanctions as a preferred weapon against U.S. adversaries. But over the past year, it’s America’s allies that are increasingly feeling the pinch, leading Washington to wonder whether its favorite economic power tool has been so overused it’s becoming ineffective and, in some cases, even counterproductive.
The
U.S. financial system is the engine of all global trade. Sanctions that are
prohibitive or otherwise too restrictive to foster trade risks driving business
to foreign markets — and, in doing so, broker new alliances between longtime
American friends and foes.
“It
is important to make sure our sanctions tools remain effective and are not
overused,” acting U.S. Treasury Undersecretary Adam Szubin said this month. “We must continue to
balance the costs and benefits of our sanctions regime in our favor.”
Szubin
oversees the Treasury Department’s counterterrorism and financial intelligence
arm. His boss, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, warned Congress in March that financial
transactions may bypass the United States if sanctions “make the business
environment too complicated or unpredictable, or if they excessively interfere
with the flow of funds worldwide.
“We
must be conscious of the risk that overuse of sanctions could undermine our
leadership position within the global economy, and the effectiveness of the
sanctions themselves,” Lew said.
Tensions
wrought by U.S. sanctions against Russia and Ukrainian separatists, for
example, have divided U.S. allies in Europe that were already financially
struggling before being hit with the economic penalties’ knock-on effects. On
Thursday, the lower house of France’s parliament voted in a nonbinding agreement to lift
EU sanctions against Russia.
“Sanctions
have been a success? No. It’s a true failure,” Italian lawmaker Deborah
Bergamini, who is also a delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe, told a Rome forum in February that pondered the West’s relations
with Russia. She said Italy has lost at least 1.25 billion euros in
exports since U.S. and European Union sanctions were imposed in 2014.
The
U.S. State Department’s chief sanctions policy coordinator, Ambassador Daniel
Fried, rejected her argument, saying sanctions were the only thing that helped
broker the 2014 cease-fire known as the Minsk agreement, which since has all
but fallen to the wayside in the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine.
“I
do not agree that sanctions are a failure,” Fried said at the conference, held
at the Center for American Studies in Rome. “If not for sanctions, we would not
have the prospect of a Minsk agreement at all — we would have more war.
Sanctions have brought about the possibility of a diplomatic solution.”
Bergamini
shot back: “Sanctions are a failure; I insist on that. … Europe is paying a big
price. Let’s admit that.”
Meanwhile, Kremlin
consultant Dmitry V. Suslov, deputy director of the Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy in Russia, sat back with a slight smile on his ruddy face.
“Sanctions
are harming both sides,” Suslov said, adding that the economic penalties have
had little sway on Russia’s military actions in Donbass: “They are proving
unable to change the Russian cause.”
New
research from the Cato Institute and the Center for a
New American Security (CNAS) has raised questions about how effective
sanctions actually are — and shows mounting evidence of their negative ripple
effect.
Cato
research fellow Emma Ashford, an expert on the politics of energy,called the sanctions against Russia an
“outright failure” that have led to food shortages and credit crunches for
ordinary Russians, and ultimately “are harming U.S. economic and geopolitical
interests.”
A
Treasury Department statement, e-mailed Thursday to Foreign
Policy,
disputed that.
“It’s
clear that our sanctions, coupled with the dramatic fall in oil prices, have
imposed great costs on Russia’s leadership with only a limited macroeconomic
effect on the U.S. and European economies,” the statement said. It went on to
say the transatlantic economic penalties “have already contributed to tighter
financial conditions, weaker confidence, and lower investment in Russia.”
Russia’s
economy has been in recession since its financial power base was hit by U.S.
and EU sanctions in 2014 as punishment for invading Ukraine. This year, the
value of the ruble hit an all-time low against the U.S.
dollar, and Moscow is reeling from low global oil prices that have sent its
projected budget revenues into a tailspin. A Reuters poll released Thursday
predicts Russia’s economy will further contract by 1.5 percent in 2016 and the
International Monetary Fund believes it will remain in recession until
next year.
The
one sanctions success story that is widely acknowledged is Iran.
In
the mid-2000s, the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union
imposed a slew of sanctions on Tehran to force the Islamic Republic to abide by
international treaties prohibiting it from building a nuclear weapon. The
sanctions were ratcheted up in 2012 amid sagging
negotiations between world powers and Tehran; as a result,
Iran’s economy cratered as the value of the rial plummeted and daily oil exports
more than halved, from 2.5 million barrels in 2011 to
1.1 million barrels in 2013.
The
financial fallout, combined with the 2013 election of relatively moderate Iran
President Hassan Rouhani, injected new urgency into the nuclear negotiations.
In July 2015, world powers agreed to lift sanctions in exchange for Iran
limiting its nuclear program — a goal that had long proven elusive.
“Our
sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program are the most powerful example of how a
broad-based effort, coupled with serious diplomacy, can succeed,” Lew told a Washington audience last month.
But
the sanctions-driven nuclear deal also spawned a political backlash against the
United States from Israel and Saudi Arabia — two key Mideast allies — that
Washington has yet to smooth over. In Congress, Republicans and some Democrats
are trying to roll back the deal, in part by increasing sanctions against Iran.
GOP lawmakers also have resisted Obama administration efforts to give Tehran
greater access to the global financial system, including conducting
transactions in dollars.
And
even Iran isn’t happy: Tehran’s Central Bank chief Valiollah Seif this
month accused the
United States and Europe of not living up to the terms of the nuclear deal by
keeping the Islamic Republic locked out of the international financial system.
Widely
overlooked in the story line of sanctions’ impact on Iran is what the
CNAS study described as much of the source —
if not predominantly so — of Iran’s financial straits: “the 2014 collapse in
oil prices and significant domestic economic mismanagement.” CNAS said that was
true for Russia, too.
Worldwide,
the Treasury Department has imposed ongoing sanctions in 28 programs. Some are
broadly splayed against geographic regions and countries, while others are
limited to specific individuals and business entities. Though the vast majority
go unnoticed — except by the people, businesses, and governments they directly
impact — more than a few have notably fallen far short of reversing aggressions
by bad actors.
In
North Korea, a U.S. trade embargo to punish Pyongyang for its nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile programs has not stopped the Hermit kingdom from launching
frequent rocket tests, including one as recently as Thursday.
In
South Sudan, the Obama administration has long threatened — including again this week — to
impose sanctions on President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar for
failing to uphold an admittedly loose peace agreement or even tone down a
bloody power struggle in its third year. But Washington has held off on
directly penalizing Kiir and Machar, although it has issued broad sanctions against people
guilty of threatening South Sudan’s stability, including through war crimes and
human rights abuses.
The
U.S. is also warning that
it may finally ask the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo against
South Sudan — a move the Obama administration has resisted for years.
U.S.
sanctions in Somalia have produced unintended — and devastating — consequences.
Experts said restrictions on money sent to Somalia have stunted funding streams
to the terror group al-Shabab, which is based there. But a 2015 report by the Center for Global
Development concluded that legitimate money transfers — whether to nonprofit
aid groups or impoverished relatives —
also were curbed.
“A
major source of income, as acknowledged by everyone in Somalia, is
remittances,” said Elizabeth Rosenberg, senior fellow and director of the energy,
economics, and security program at CNAS. “You shut off a major source of income
for the country.”
But
most of the consternation over U.S. sanctions centers on those imposed against
oligarchs in Russia and warring separatists in eastern Ukraine — and whether
Europe will continue to support the penalties.
Beyond
France and Italy, there’s also growing momentum in Germany to lift the
sanctions. Last month, German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel calledfor the European Union to try to create
conditions by this summer to eliminate the penalties. Trade between Moscow and
Berlin has dropped by nearly 12 billion euros ($13.6 billion) — a quarter of
the total value between 2014 and 2015, said Michael Harms, chairman of the Russian-German Chamber of
Commerce.
EU
leaders are expected to decide whether to extend their sanctions by June. Treasury
officials said Thursday that they believe the sanctions will hold, based on
conversations President Barack Obama had last week with several European
leaders.
Direct
foreign investment in Russia has plunged from
$69 billion in 2013 to $23 billion in 2014, after Moscow invaded Crimea. Anders
Åslund, an economic policy expert at the Atlantic Council, said that’s exactly
what the sanctions were designed to do — proving they do have some bite.
“International
finance in Russia is a one-way street out of Russia. There’s no possibility to
get alternative financing,” he said.
But
the flip side of that coin is the economic impact the sanctions have had on
Europe.
The
European Commission estimates sanctions cut EU growth by 0.3 percent of GDP in
2015 at a time when economic expansion was desperately needed. The Austrian
Institute of Economic Research found that continuing penalties against Russia
could cost more than 92 billion euros, or
$104 billion, in export revenue and more than 2.2 million jobs over the next
few years. The financial pain is especially acute in Germany, which stands to lose nearly 400,000 jobs due
to the sanctions.
And
adding insult to the EU’s economic injury, the CNAS report this month concluded that
modern-day sanctions “do not have a significant effect on the GDP of target
countries.”
Sanctions
“do, however, have a powerful impact on foreign investment, corruption, ease of
doing business, governance, and other measures of a country’s hospitality to
engagement with the international financial community,” the report found.
This
is probably why many Western officials are re-thinking sanctions’ power in lieu
of other means to stare down adversaries. In February, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense
Christine Wormuth admitted that the sanctions had “not
changed so far what Russia has been doing on the ground, and that is the great
concern.”
Rosenberg,
the CNAS fellow, said “it’s not the case” that sanctions directly cause GDPs to
plummet. She said there is no single, simple way to measure the effectiveness
of sanctions, which have also hurt the U.S. economy — although there’s no way
of knowing how much.
“It’s
appalling that we’ve used this set of economic tools so aggressively to go
after Russia, a huge global economy, without doing robust modeling of effects
and consequences,” Rosenberg said.
“There
are clearly costs, it’s just a matter of if we’re willing to pay them.”
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